How the Supreme Court’s Rejection of Election‑Law and Gun‑Rights Petitions Affects States, Voters, and Second Amendment Protections

In the early weeks of 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a trio of unremarked denials of certiorari in cases backed by Republican interests—appeals that, taken together, promised to redefine the parameters of two of the most contentious arenas in contemporary American jurisprudence: the regulation of federal elections by the states, and the scope of Second Amendment protections.

First, in Jacobsen v. Montana Democratic Party, the Court declined to entertain Montana’s challenge to its own state supreme court’s invalidation of two 2021 statutes: one eliminating Election‑Day voter registration, and the other prohibiting paid third‑party ballot collection. Secretary of State Christi Jacobsen argued this was the ideal case to flesh out the contours of the so‑called independent‑state‑legislature (ISL) theory—yet the justices passed on the opportunity.

On that same January day, the Court also let stand adverse lower‑court rulings in two consolidated gun‑rights petitions, denying review of Delaware’s 2022 ban on certain semiautomatic rifles and high‑capacity magazines, and Maryland’s decade‑old handgun‑qualification license (HQL) requirement. No of the orders drew written dissents, but each preserved the status quo: Montana’s voting‑procedure protections remained in force, and Delaware and Maryland’s gun‑control measures continued unimpeded.

Taken together, these denials illustrate the current Roberts Court’s dual posture: boldly expanding constitutional doctrine in landmark merits decisions, yet exercising caution before clarifying the boundaries of those new rules in follow‑on cases. This article unpacks the legal doctrines at stake, reviews each petition’s backstory, and explores what the denials portend for state election‑law regulation, voter access, and the ongoing evolution of Second Amendment jurisprudence.


1. The Independent‑State‑Legislature Theory: From Moore to Jacobsen

At the heart of Jacobsen v. Montana Democratic Party lies the “independent‑state‑legislature” theory, which advances a literalist reading of the Elections Clause. That clause provides that the “Times, Places and Manner” of federal elections “shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” Proponents insist that because the text singles out “the Legislature,” neither state courts nor executive officials may override or second‑guess state election laws. Critics counter that such a reading would eviscerate judicial review, enable unfettered partisan gerrymandering, and roll back key voter‑access protections.

Though ISL arguments date back at least to Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Bush v. Gore (2000), the Supreme Court only squarely addressed the theory in Moore v. Harper (2023). In Moore, North Carolina’s highest court had invalidated a legislative‑drawn congressional map under the state constitution. The Court’s 6–3 majority upheld the state‑court ruling, rejecting the most extreme form of ISL and affirming that state judiciaries retain authority to enforce their own constitutions so long as they do not “transgress[] the ordinary bounds of judicial review.” Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion left open, however, the question of “how far is too far”—i.e., what objective standard should federal courts apply when evaluating whether a state court has overreached.

Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Moore explicitly invited a future test case to sharpen that standard. Montana’s appeal in Jacobsen aimed to do precisely that, asking the Supreme Court to adopt a clear, administrable rule delimiting state‑court authority over federal‑election statutes. By turning down the petition, the Court signaled reluctance to set such a boundary without a cleaner vehicle—one hinging purely on federal constitutional law rather than mixed state‑constitutional and factual findings.


2. Montana’s Election‑Day Registration and Ballot‑Collection Statutes: Origins and Litigation

2.1 Legislative Background

In 2021, Montana’s Republican legislature enacted two high‑profile voting restrictions:

  1. HB 176 eliminated the state’s popular Election‑Day registration program, which had long allowed eligible individuals to register or update their information up to and including the day of voting.

  2. HB 530 barred compensated third parties from collecting and returning ballots on Election Day, effectively outlawing paid ballot‑harvesting by advocates, civic groups, and political campaigns.

Proponents touted administrative efficiency and the prevention of potential fraud, while opponents argued these measures disproportionately burdened Native American voters, rural residents who travel long distances to the polls, students, and first‑time electors.

2.2 Lower‑Court Proceedings

After a nine‑day bench trial featuring expert testimony on travel distances to polling sites, wait‑time data, and historical rates of ballot rejection, a Montana district court concluded that both statutes violated the state constitution’s guarantees of suffrage and equality. The court found that the laws imposed “severe” burdens on the right to vote without a sufficient state interest justification.

On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court (5–2) affirmed. It held that the legislature had failed to show any appreciable fraud that justified dismantling well‑established voter registration and ballot collection practices, and that the restrictions ran afoul of Montana’s explicit right‑to‑vote and equal‑protection provisions.

2.3 The Petition for Certiorari

Secretary Jacobsen, joined by Attorney General Knudsen, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Montana decision. They framed it as the ideal ISL test case—urging the justices to curtail what they called “boundless” state‑court power and to articulate a federal check on state judicial invalidation of duly enacted election laws. Fifteen Republican attorneys general, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, and America First Legal filed supporting briefs.

Opposing review, the Montana Democratic Party (alongside tribal organizations and youth‑voter groups) argued that Jacobsen presented no substantial federal question, because the litigation hinged on state‑constitutional grounds: a traditional bar to certiorari. They also stressed the ample record evidence of undue burdens on Montana’s most vulnerable voters.

On January 21, 2025, the Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment, leaving Montana’s voting‑procedure protections fully in place.


3. Reading the Montana Decision: Implications for the Elections Clause

A narrow reading of the denial suggests only that at least four justices declined to grant review. A broader view, however, indicates the Court’s preference to allow the post‑Moore legal landscape to mature at the trial‑court and intermediate‑appellate levels before staking out a definitive rule. By declining an ISL showdown in a case intertwined with state‑constitutional adjudication and extensive factual findings, the Court preserved its certiorari discretion and avoided prematurely constraining state‑court authority.

For now, state judiciaries retain significant latitude under their own constitutions to safeguard voting rights—so long as they do not stray so far from traditional textual, historical, and precedential boundaries that federal intervention becomes essential. Meanwhile, appellate skirmishes in Ohio, Arizona, and North Carolina—cases more narrowly focused on pure questions of federal constitutional law—may offer cleaner paths for the Court to revisit the ISL question.


4. The Modern Second Amendment: From Heller to Bruen

4.1 District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)

In Heller, the Supreme Court for the first time unequivocally recognized an individual right to possess firearms for lawful self‑defense, striking down Washington, D.C.’s total ban on handguns.

4.2 McDonald v. Chicago (2010)

Two years later, McDonald incorporated the Heller ruling against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, extending individual‑right protections to local and state gun‑control regimes.

4.3 New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022)

In Bruen, the Court overhauled the prevailing Second Amendment framework, rejecting the two‑step means‑ends scrutiny test in favor of a historical‑analogue approach. Under Bruen’s “text, history, and tradition” standard, any modern firearms regulation must be supported by a well‑established analogue from the Founding era or Reconstruction period. Bruen thus opened the floodgates for challenges to a wide array of restrictions—age limits, concealed‑carry licensing, assault‑weapon bans—even as the Court itself proceeded cautiously, denying many petitions while lower courts applied the new test.


5. Delaware’s Semiautomatic Rifle and High‑Capacity Magazine Ban

5.1 Legislative Genesis

In June 2022, in the wake of the Uvalde school massacre, Delaware enacted House Bill 450 (and a companion Senate substitute) banning the sale, transfer, and importation of more than forty listed semiautomatic rifle models—most famously AR‑15 and AK‑style platforms—as well as magazines capable of holding over seventeen rounds. Pre‑existing weapons were grandfathered but not permitted for future transactions.

5.2 Litigation History

Shortly after enactment, the Firearms Policy Coalition, Second Amendment Foundation, a licensed dealer, and individual state residents sued in federal district court, arguing that semiautomatic rifles in “common use” plainly fall within Bruen’s protection. In March 2023, Judge Richard Andrews denied a preliminary injunction, finding the plaintiffs unlikely to succeed on the merits and accepting Delaware’s public‑safety justifications under Bruen’s historical‑analogue test.

A Third Circuit panel affirmed in January 2024, concluding that Delaware’s ban bore enough historical resemblance—through analogues to 19th‑century militia‑style regulations—to survive Bruen scrutiny. An en banc rehearing was denied.

5.3 Supreme Court Denial

On January 13, 2025, the Supreme Court denied certiorari without dissent. The order preserves Delaware’s ban during the full merits-phase litigation, likely delaying final resolution for years. Gun‑rights advocates lament that each month of continued enforcement entrenches new regulatory precedents. State officials counter that the Third Circuit’s nuanced decision reflects a developing consensus: while handguns may enjoy the strongest protection, military‑style semiautomatics and high‑capacity magazines can be subject to heightened regulation in the name of public safety.


6. Maryland’s Handgun‑Qualification License Regime

6.1 The 2013 Firearm Safety Act

In response to the Sandy Hook massacre, Maryland enacted the Firearm Safety Act of 2013, which requires prospective handgun purchasers to obtain a Handgun Qualification License (HQL) before acquiring a firearm from a dealer. The HQL process mandates:

  • Four hours of firearm‑safety training;

  • Submission of fingerprints;

  • A successful criminal‑history background check.

Although separate wear‑and‑carry permits govern public bearing, the HQL applies to all dealer sales and many transfers, effectively gating handgun acquisitions behind mandatory training and clearance.

6.2 Lower‑Court Proceedings

Challenged by Maryland Shall Issue and individual would‑be buyers, the statute survived a district‑court challenge in 2020. After Bruen, a Fourth Circuit panel initially struck down the HQL under the historical‑analogue test, but an en banc Fourth Circuit reversed (10–5) in August 2024. The full court held that the HQL is a “narrowly tailored, history‑consistent condition” akin to 19th‑century surety‑bond requirements or early‑era militia‑enrollment regulations.

6.3 Supreme Court Response

The petitioners urged emergency relief from the Supreme Court, arguing that any HQL “deprivation of Second Amendment rights necessarily constitutes irreparable injury.” The Court declined to intervene, leaving the en banc Fourth Circuit’s nuanced ruling intact. The denial signals that, absent an entrenched circuit split, the justices will not micromanage every procedural regulation—even under Bruen’s demanding standard—so long as the government can point to credible historical parallels for training, registration, or licensing prerequisites.


7. Why the Court Is Saying “No” (for Now)

Several interlocking rationales help explain the Supreme Court’s restraint on certiorari in these election‑law and gun‑rights petitions:

  1. Vehicle Issues

    • Jacobsen was mired in state‑constitutional grounds and extensive factual findings, making it an unattractive vehicle for clarifying the ISL doctrine.

    • The Delaware petition sought emergency injunction relief rather than full merits review.

    • The Maryland case emerged from en banc doctrinal flux as Bruen principles settled in lower courts.

  2. Doctrinal Sequencing

    • The Court often announces broad principles in blockbuster merits decisions, then waits for circuit splits before revisiting next‑tier questions. Both post‑Moore election disputes and post‑Bruen gun cases have not yet produced entrenched, nationwide splits.

  3. Docket Management

    • With several high‑stakes merits cases on the horizon—United States v. Rahimi (domestic‑violence gun possession), Idaho v. United States (abortion‑travel restrictions), disputes over social‑media platform liability—the Court may be pacing its workload.

  4. Institutional Legitimacy

    • Public confidence in the Supreme Court hovers near historic lows. Granting certiorari in every politically charged petition risks fueling perceptions of ideological activism. Denials allow the Court to avoid stoking partisan controversy.

  5. Strategic Incrementalism

    • Conservatives argue that overly cautious denials invite “nullification” by hostile lower courts. Progressives counter that incremental doctrinal development preserves stability and allows the new rules to anchor in lower‑court jurisprudence before the Court refines them further.


8. What Comes Next?

8.1 Election‑Law Frontiers

  • Arizona’s Mail‑Ballot Deadline: The Arizona Supreme Court may soon invalidate a legislature‑approved deadline, setting up a direct ISL rematch in the Ninth Circuit.

  • Ohio’s Photo‑ID Requirement: Challengers assert that strict voter‑ID rules violate the Ohio Constitution’s suffrage guarantee, potentially producing another divide between state and federal courts.

  • North Carolina Litigation: After Moore, new challenges to redistricting and election‑law amendments could force the Supreme Court to define the “ordinary bounds” of judicial review.

8.2 Gun‑Rights Battles

  • United States v. Rahimi: Argued in November 2024, this case challenges a federal domestic‑violence gun ban. Its late‑June 2025 decision will clarify Bruen’s application to prohibitions based on individual risk factors rather than weapon type.

  • Rhode Island Magazine Limits: Pending petitions contest a three‑round magazine restriction under Bruen.

  • Age‑Restriction Disputes: A recent Seventh Circuit split over minimum‑age purchase limits may compel Supreme Court review.

8.3 Legislative and Advocacy Responses

  • Blue‑State Expansion: Encouraged by the Court’s deference, Democratic‑led legislatures appear poised to tighten assault‑weapon bans and magazine caps, while experimenting with registration and training requirements.

  • Red‑State Retrenchment: Inspired by conservative cert‑denials, Republican‑controlled legislatures may press ahead with restrictive ballot collection and voter‑ID statutes, but mindful that robust state constitutional records will be crucial to withstand judicial scrutiny.

  • Grassroots Mobilization: Both voting‑rights and gun‑rights advocates are intensifying efforts to develop trial‑court records—particularly historical evidence—to frame future federal‑constitutional challenges.


Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s unheralded certiorari denials in January 2025 underscore a defining paradox of the Roberts Court: a readiness to reshape constitutional doctrines in landmark merits rulings, coupled with a deliberate, incremental approach to clarifying those doctrines’ outer limits.

By leaving Montana’s Election‑Day registration and compensated ballot‑collection enjoinments intact, the Court endorsed the continued vitality of state constitutional protections against legislative rollbacks—at least until it finds a clearer vehicle to define the independent‑state‑legislature doctrine. By refusing to block Delaware’s semiautomatic‑rifle ban and Maryland’s handgun‑qualification license, it signaled that Bruen’s rigorous historical test can coexist, for now, with a measure of state experimentation in firearm regulation—so long as lower courts assemble plausible original‑era analogues.

Neither side achieved an unequivocal triumph. Instead, the Court pressed “pause,” shifting the battlefield to state capitals, trial‑court records rooms, and federal appeals courts. In that hiatus lie both opportunity and challenge—for legislatures drafting new laws, advocates building trial records, and lower courts wrestling with doctrines still in flux. The nation’s most contentious public‑policy debates are far from settled; they have simply moved to the arenas that will shape the next generation of constitutional law.

Categories: Politics
Adrian Hawthorne

Written by:Adrian Hawthorne All posts by the author

Adrian Hawthorne is a celebrated author and dedicated archivist who finds inspiration in the hidden stories of the past. Educated at Oxford, he now works at the National Archives, where preserving history fuels his evocative writing. Balancing archival precision with creative storytelling, Adrian founded the Hawthorne Institute of Literary Arts to mentor emerging writers and honor the timeless art of narrative.

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